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THE KNIGHT COMMANDER CASE
Although but one of several instances of the same sort, involv-
ing the question of the legality of the destruction 
of a neutral
ship by a belligerent, the sinking of the Knight Commander
excited so much adverse comment in England 
at the time and
has given rise to so much discussion since, as 
to make it a test
case, one upon which it is convenient to base 
an inquiry.
The essential facts concerning ship, cargo and 
voyage are as
follows: She was an English merchant steamer; 
she carried a
mixed cargo which included flour and railway 
material; her route
was from New York to Manila, to Shanghai, finally 
to Yokohama;
she was visited by the Vladivostok squadron 
off the Japanese
coast; the Russian officers declared the cargo 
to be contraband
but owing to the ship's lack of coal she could 
not be taken before
the Vladivostok prize court for trial; the crew 
was accordingly
taken off and the ship sunk. The ship's papers 
were lodged with
the prize court sitting at Vladivostok, a trial 
was held and the
destruction of the ship justified. An appeal was 
entered by the
British owner and damages asked for on account 
of the cargo as
well; the case tried before the Russian Council of 
Admiralty, but
the decision of the lower court affirmed by decree 
of November
19, 1905.*
In examining the legality of this destruction, 
the first step is
to emphasize the distinction between a neutral 
and an enemy ship
as subjects of such casualty. In our Civil War, 
Semmes in the
Alabama, having neither prize crews to spare, 
nor ports open to
him, burned a majority of his prizes and has 
been generally
justified in so doing. This is not a similar case. 
It is lawful to
seize enemy's property at sea, merely because 
of its ownership.
Self interest will dictate the making beneficial 
use of such
*Decided: i. To maintain the decision of the Vladivostok 
Prize Court
and to leave the appeal made by Attorney Bojenoff 
in behalf of the owner of
the steamer Knight Commander without consideration.
2. To leave the petitions of the Attorneys Sheftel 
and Berline in behalf
of the cargo owners of goods non-contraband of war, 
and for compensation
for losses, with examination.
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property if it can be carried infra piraesidia; if not it may be de-
stroyed. But it is not lawful to seize the property of neutrals
unless it is engaged in a forbidden trade. As there was no claim
that either the Knight Commander or its cargo were Japanese
property, the reason above given to justify destruction, viz.:
that it was enemy's property, is inapplicable.
Of all forms of forbidden trade, perhaps the carrying of con-
traband is the most common. The rule governing this traffic is
very dlear. The onus of prevention rests upon the belligerent
injured by it, the neutral state merely warning its own subjects
of the risk of confiscation involved. To make goods contraband,
they must be shown to be directly available for carrying on war
and also to have a hostile destination. For instance, gunpowder
bound for the German colony of Kiao Chau would not have this
character. The ship is not involved in the penalty, nor the non-
contraband portion of the cargo, unless under exceptional cir-
cumstances which prove complicity, such as identity of owner-
ship or such a preponderance of contraband in the cargo as to
argue the voyage to have been undertaken for its sake, to argue
complicity. But ordinarily the ship is not confiscated with the
guilty portion of the cargo. It is important to bear this in mind.
Now this statement of the rule, making it essential to know the
character of the goods, the ownership of the entire cargo, the
ownership and final destination of the ship, shows the need of a
searching investigation and one of a truly judicial nature before
condemnation can take place, lest injustice be done. And so the
final condition of the infliction of penalty for carrying contraband
is that sentence must be passed upon it by a prize court.
We are now ready for our real inquiry which is twofold: may
neutral contraband be lawfully destroyed at sea without judicial
condemnation under any circumstances; may it be so destroyed
subject to compensation, the Knight Commander being taken as
.a case in point.
These are the considerations involved:
(i) The injustice of penalizing a ship not shown to be guilty.
(2) The insufficiency of an exiParte examination of cargo at sea.
(3) Validity of excuses for destruction.
(4) The doctrine of conditional contraband; its application
to this cargo.
(5) Is destruction ever permissable?
(6) Is destruction lawful subject to compensation?
Let us examine these questions seriatim; certain being capa-
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ble of determination by the light of reason solely, while others
rest upon precedent and the opinions of jurists.
So far as I am aware the injustice of destruction attaching as
a penalty to the neutral ship, even granting that it is carrying
contraband, has not been sufficiently emphasized in the Knight
Commander case.
The argument is this: To condemn a ship carrying contra-
band it must be shown that it belonged to the owner of the
contraband or that the contraband formed so large a portion of
the cargo as to prove complicity. This is an intricate business
of a highly judicial nature, demanding the production of papers
and examination of witnesses. It will be later shown what grave
doubt existed as to the really contraband character of the cargo in
question. But laying this aside, the case in point shows us a pen-
alty, namely, the loss of the ship, which according to the accepted
rules governing contraband would not have been inflicted by any
well-regulated prize court, unless the owner of the ship was
shown to be the owner of the cargo as well, as to which there is
no proof that the searching officer made inquiry. 'Thus we find
this case to involve an enlargement of the accepted penalties for
carrying contraband.
2. The vast difference between the cursory exparte judgment
upon all the facts in a ship's case, and a judicial examination of
the same is also to be noted as a sound reason against the prac-
tice we are considering. In port, the cargo can be landed, its
character ascertained, its ownership inquired into, the ship like-
wise investigated, its destination learned and witnesses summoned
in proof of all, beside that evidence which the ship's papers give.
This trial, before a court trained to jiudge the credibility of
evidence, if properly conducted, creates so strong a presumption
of guilt or innocence that few governments will venture to chal-
lenge its verdict. It must be admitted that the prize court of
first instance sitting at Vladivostok seems to have been scarcely
a judicial body; it seems to have existed for condemnation only.
This apparent blemish upon the Russian judicial system may
lower the Vladivostok court in our eyes but it will not thereby
raise the navy officer into a satisfactory judicial position. He
cannot unload the cargo; he at best can only guess the uses of
the cargo; its ownership and that of the ship are shown to him
by the ship's papers, not by outside evidence; he assumes judicial
functions without being in possession of the facts or having a
judicial mind. It is as if the sheriff were to judge the guilt of a
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supposed criminal whom he had arrested, and not only impose
sentence but execute it on the spot even to the death penalty.
This evident misplacing of the judicial function is a strong argu-
ment against the legality of the act under review. This was
keenly felt in England by the government. The Marquis of Lans-
downe said, in the House of Lords, July 28, 1904, "Upon no
hypothesis of International Law can we conceive that a neutral
ship, even if it be ascertained that her cargo included contraband
of war, could be destroyed in this manner upon the mere fiat of
the commanding officer of the capturing squadron and without
reference to a properly constituted prize court." (London Times,
July 29, 1904.)
And the same day in the Commons, Balfour characterized the
practice as follows: "Evidently if it is left to the captain of a
cruiser to decide on his own initiative and authority as to
whether the particular articles carried by the ship do or do not
belong to the category of contraband of war, what is not merely
the practice of nations but what is a necessary foundation of
equitable relations between belligerents and neutrals, would be
cut down to the root." He was speaking generally, but went on
to say specifically of the Knigzt Commander case, "In our view
that is entirely contrary to the accepted practice of civilized na-
tions in the case of war."
3. What were the excuses for a failure to carry the alleged
prize before a court for trial?
The justification seems to have been founded upon certain
clauses in the Russian prize regulations issued March 25, 1895.
These stipulated that "in extraordinary cases where the saving
of a seized vessel is rendered impossible by its bad condition, its
low value, the danger of its being retaken by the enemy, the fact
of its being at a considerable distance from Russian ports, or
the ports being in a state of blockade and dangers threatening
the capturing vessel or its operations, the naval commander may
on his own responsibility burn or sink the vessel seized after hav-
ing landed the persons on board and as far as possible the cargo,
as well as having taken other measures for the preservation of
papers and other articles on board likely to be required" at an
investigation before a prize court. A statement by the naval
commander responsible for the act was also provided for. Now
according to a dispatch in the London Times of August 3, 1904,
Vice-Admiral Skrydloff telegraphed his Czar that the Knight
Commander could not be sent to port to be tried owing to her
lack of coal.
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Here there are three things to be remarked: first, that the
ship being sunk, her sufficiency of coal to carry her several day's
sail beyond her destination could neither be proved nor dis-
proved.
Again, although these regulations might justify the Russian
Admiral, they could not excuse the Russian government unless
they can be shown to be in conformity with usage.
And thirdly, there is nothing in these regulations so far as
noted, to show whether they were really intended to apply to
neutral vessels, it being usual for states to prescribe rules as to
the treatment of enemy vessels, destruction amongst them.
That the eminent Russian publicist Professor de Martens,
twenty years before had excused the destruction of prizes is re-
called by Professor Holland, he alleging the distance of Russian
ports from the scene of possible naval operations, so that what
other states will resort to only in extremity, will become for Russia
the rule, though frankly admitting that such a practice would
raise against his country universal dislike-yet even here there
is no certainty that destruction of neutral prizes is included in
this claim.
4. Hitherto we have gone on the assumption that the Knight
Commander contained some contraband. It is now in order to
examine this question. Her cargo, by the London Times report,
was said to be "rails, rice and flour." Admiral Skrydloff wired
that railway material made up a considerable part of the Knight
Commander's cargo. Assuming that she carried railway iron
and breadstuffs, bound for an enemy's port, namely, Yokohama,
could these by the accepted usage be held to be contraband?
This brings up the doctrine of conditional contraband. Very
briefly this means that articles capable of use in peace as well as
war, must have their intended military availability and purpose
shown to render them guilty. Thus according to this doctrine
the railway plant carried by the Knight Commander would be
contraband only if it could be shown to be intended for military
use in Korea or Manchuria. As its destination was Yokohama
this would be difficult. So likewise the foodstuffs on board unless
intended specifically for army use, must be held innocent.
Without going at length into this doctrine it is enough to say
that it was originated by Lord Stowell in the Jonge iyfargarciha
(i. C. Rob. i89); followed by our own Courts in the Commercen
(x Wheat. 382); and since upheld by most writers of these two
countries and by a certain number of continental publicists.
For a fuller discussion I refer to Professor Hershey's note, in his
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recent and valuable work on the International Law of the Russo-
Japanese war, p. 161, or Scott's Cases. The regulations govern-
ing the British, Japanese and United States navies recognize the
doctrine.
But the Russian government at the outset of the war dodged
the question by the simple expedient of declaring all foodstuffs,
all fuels, all railway material to be contraband "if they are trans-
ported on the account of or are destined for the enemy" ignoring
the factor of their military use. The continental writers do not,
however, support the Russian contention but the contrary, for
they incline to hold that these articles, ancizitis usus, can never
be held contraband not that they are always so. Thus whatever
one may think of the doctrine of conditional contraband, the
Knight Commander case illustrates a novel and arbitrary enlarge-
ment of the list of contraband and one without precedent, save
that attempt of France to make rice contraband in her affair with -
China in 1885, an attempt which was not put to the test.
And Russia herself later in the recent war seems to have held
provisions to be conditionally, not absolutely contraband.
5 and 6. Quite apart from the questions above discussed, we
now ask whether the destruction of a neutral ship is ever justifi-
able or is justifiable subject to the payment of compensation.
The two questions are not easily separable and are therefore
considered together.
To the first question Phillimore and Hall reply, no. Hall de-
clares that the destruction of a neutral ship is a "punishable
wrong; if it cannot be brought in for adjudication it can and
and ought to be released." Sec. 277. Taylor, Sec. 69r, says the
same. Lawrence, Sec. 2 15, is of the opinion that neutral owners
"have a right to insist that an adjudication upon their claim shall
precede any further dealings with it." Snow in his manual for
the U. S. Navy, p. 164, is even more explicit. "Neutral prop-
erty can only be transferred and condemned by proper courts
and trial so it is not proper to destroy it. If a neutral vessel can-
not be brought into port for adjudication, it should be released."
And the latest British writer, Oppenheim (II. p. 470), is to the
same effect. "The rule is that a neutral prize must be aban-
doned in case it cannot, for any reason whatever, be brought to a
port of a Prize Court." Various cases adjudicated are to the
same purport. I quote a single one. The Felicity (2 Dodson
380) in which Sir W. Scott thus expresses himself: "If a neutral
ship or protected ship is destroyed by a captor either wantonly or
under an alleged necessity in which she herself was not directly
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involved, the captor or his government is answerable for the
spoliation." He mentions compensation it is true but as a pen-
alty for a wrong not as legalizing the act of destruction. This
great Admiralty judge goes on to say "If impossible to bring
in, their next duty is to destroy enemy's property. Where doubt-
ful whether enemy's property, and impossible to bring in, no such
obligation arises and the safe and proper course is to dismiss.
Where it is neutral the act of destruction cannot be justified to
the neutral owner by the gravest importance of such an act to
the public service of the captor's own state; to the neutral it can
only be justified under any such circumstances by a full restitu-
tion in value."
Amongst foreign publicists are also found those who fully
adopt this rule, that destruction of the neutral ship and cargo
are unlawful. Thus Kleen (II. 530): "Or, ce qui est absolument
contraire au droit international, c'est de dgtruire sans jugement
rggulier des prises neutres." "La destruction d'une propridt6
neutre n'est jamais une ndcessit6 de la guerre, car le bellig6rent
ne se ddfend pas par cela contre son ennemi." Both British and
and Japanese Admiralty regulations likewise forbid destruction
of the neutral.
To the contrary may be cited Art. 5o, of the U. S. Naval War
Code, which allows destruction in case of controlling reasons, "if
there should be no doubt that the vessel was a proper prize,"
but without applying this rule specifically to neutral ships, and
without a trial and condemnation can neutral ships, be proper
prize without doubt.
"France allows her captors to destroy prizes-apparently
neutral as well as enemy prizes-where the destruction is neces-
sary for the safety of the captor or for the success of his opera-
tions." (Oppenheim, II. p. 471.)
The Institute of International Law in z882 adopted a code
which regulated maritime capture. Art. 5o , reads: "It shall be
permitted a captor to sink or burn his prize after taking on
board her crew and as much of her cargo as possible and pre-
serving her papers for the judicial inquiry and for the owners'
claims ;" in five cases of necessity, viz.: the unseaworthiness of
the prize; storm; danger of recapture; lack of men; distance
from home port. But this again is not in so many words made
applicable to neutrals.
In 1887 the Institute enlarged and repeated this code. The
same want of explicitness runs through the opinions of continen-
tal writers, who are commonly cited on the affirmative of this
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,question. They allow the destruction of prizes but fail to spec-
ify that they mean both neutral and enemy ships. And even so
they are lukewarm advocates. Calvo brings their opinions
together (V. 277). Thus Bluntschli declares .that the captured
ship as a rule must be sent before the. captor's prize court. One
is never authorized to destroy a prize under the pretext that the
captor's ports are blockaded. Such a difficulty does not enlarge
the rights of the captor. The destruction of the captured ship
is only justifiable in case of absolute necessity.
Boeck argues that one may destroy ships as one may destroy
property in land warfare, on the basis of military necessity but
with the reservation that every prize must be judged.
Perels says that destruction of a prize is only justifiable if
said prize could not be sent in without serious risk. After its
destruction a judicial decision must confirm the validity of the
capture. This if found to be illegal must be indemnified.
His own views' Calvo does not clearly give but by way of
illustrating them cites the case of two German ships sunk by a
French cruiser in 187o. They were enemy ships but with neu-
tral goods on board which also perished. A claim for damages
was made against France because, under the Declaration of
Paris, such goods in an enemy's ship were exempt. This claim
Calvo repudiates, as the French prize court did, on the ground
that the destruction of the ships was justified by the necessity
of "preserving the safety of the captor's operations," and grant-
ing the legality of this act, neutial goods, however exempt from
capture, cannot be held exempt from incidental destruction.
In support of the legality of destroying neutral prizes under
special conditions, Oppenheim cites Fiore, Geffeken, Martens
and Dupuis. It may be doubted, however, if they preserve the
distinction between neutral and eziemy prizes sharply, and one
must remember that the continental publicists have in the main
advocated leniency rather than harshness in the rules of prize,
opposing the doctrines of the English Admiralty Courts.
It is at least permissible to say that there is no consensus of
clear unequivocal opinion amongst continental writers in favor
of the Russian contention, but only here and there an expression
capable of being so construed, while British opinion is nearly a
unit in forbidding destruction under any and all circumstances.
One English publicist of authority, however, fails to share in
the extreme view. In a paper read before the British Academy
in April, x9o5, and printed in the "Fortnightly Review" of May,
19o5, Professor Holland, discussing the neutral duty of acquies-
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cence in belligerent acts, touches upon the Knight Commander
case and what it illustrates. "If, however, the ship or cargo
be neutral, the matter is not so simple. The Neutral Govern-
ment is not bound to acquiesce in the destruction of the possibly
innocent property of its subjects, at any rate unless some over-
whelming necessity can be shown for the course which has been
adopted; if indeed even overwhelming necessity would be suffi-
cient to justify it. This is of course the question raised by the
sinking of the British ship Knight Commander, which was
effected on July 23rd, 1904, in accordance with the Russian
instructions and was approved of by the Vladivostok Prize
Court. The attitude of the British Government has been all
along adverse to the legitimacy of such a step. Before the
occurrence our ambassador had intimated our disapproval of the
Russian instructions on the point and he presented a strong
protest against the sinking five days after its occurrence. The
incident was discussed in both Houses of Parliament (July 28th,
August izth) and was spoken of by ministers as an 'outrage, 'a
serious breach of International Law.' I am not sure that this
language could be fully supported by a reference to the opinion
and practice of nations. While it is, on principle, most undesir-
able that neutral property should be exposed to destruction
without enquiry, cases may occasionally occur in which a bellig-
erent could hardly be expected to permit the escape of such
property, though he is unable to send it in for adjudication.
The contrary opinion is, I venture to think, largely derived from
a reliance upon detached paragraphs in one of Lord Stowell's
judgments on the subject, judgments which, taken together,
show little more than that in his view no plea of national inter-
est will bar the claim of a neutral owner to be fully compen-
sated for the value of his property, where it has been destroyed
without judicial proof of its noxious character. 'Where doubt-
ful whether enemy property and impossible to bring in, the safe
and proper course,' says Lord Stowell, 'is to dismiss.' The
Admiralty Manual of 1888 accordingly directs commanders who
are unable to send in their prizes, to 'release the vessel and
cargo without ransom unless there is clear proof that she belongs
to the enemy.' This indulgence can hardly, however, be pro-
claimed as an established rule of International Law, in the face
of the fact that the sinking of neutral prizes is under certain cir-
cumstances permitted by the Prize Codes, not only of Russia
but also of such Powers as France, the United States and Japan
(1904.)" This able and interesting exposition of the law as to
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the destruction of neutral prizes, is the strongest argument for
the Russian view which appeared in England from any one of
competence. Yet it will be noticed how guarded and qualified
its language is. Moreover, there may be two opinions as to the
meaning of Lord Stowell's dictum in the "Felicity." The
phrase "no such obligation arises" (see above) which Prof. Hol-
land does not quote, to my mind marks off the status of enemy
ships and the reason for their destruction from that of neutral
ships and the necessity for compensation in their case if
destroyed, in such fashion as to show that the Judge considered
such destruction thoroughly illegal. As for the language of the
Prize Codes of the United States, Japan and France, to which
Prof. Holland appeals, is it not possible that he is misled by
their indefiniteness of wording, by their failure to make a clear
distinction between enemy and neutral prizes in this matter of
destruction? It is at least significant that neither country has
resorted to this usage. Moreover, fully considering this very
question in the "Discussions" of the Naval War College at New-
port, in 1905, our naval officers and their adviser came to the
following conclusion: "If a seized neutral vessel cannot for any
reason be brought into port for adjudication, it should be dis-
missed," a conclusion which does them honor.
In the foregoing discussion, the distinction has not been
sharply observed between compensation paid for a destroyed
neutral ship as implying a penalty for an unlawful act, and com-
pensation interpreted as the price to be paid by the belligerent
for destruction as a military necessity acting within his rights.
Is there not a real difference between the two, and is not the
second identical with thejus angariae, a well-known principle in
war and recognized by the United States Naval War Code, Art.
6, in these words: "If military necessity should require it, neu-
tral vessels found within the limits of belligerent authority may
be seized and destroyed or otherwise utilized for military pur-
poses, but in such cases the owners of neutral vessels must be
fully recompensed. The amount of the indemnity should if
practicable be agreed on in advance with the owner or master of
the vessel. Due regard must be had to treaty stipulations upon
these matters."
With this distinction clearly in mind and thejus angariae to
justify destruction on account of the military necessity alluded
to by Prof. Holland, it is contended that the only reason for
exceptions to the rule disappears, and that we are justified in
laying down as probably the usage of to-day,-with the sole
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exception of Russia,-that neutral ships which cannot be taken
before a court for trial must be released. If military necessity
demands they may be appropriated or destroyed subject to full
payment.
In defense of this rule are the following considerations: This
is substantially the usage of to-day except in Russia. This is
the opinion almost unanimous of British and American writers.
Continental publicists while not unanimous, are fairly favorable
to this rule. Neutral states demand it as a reasonable measure,
in their interest. It is a logical rule because otherwise you are
enlarging the penalty of carrying contraband, making ship lia-
ble with the goods, and conferring improper judicial authority
upon a naval officer not trained for it. If this is not the rule,
yet it is a reasonable rule, and as it is the fashion now-a-days to
say, the next Hague Conference should make it a rule.
Theodore S. Woolsey.
